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MATTIA BRANCATO 
LEIBNIZ, WEIGEL AND THE BIRTH OF  
BINARY ARITHMETIC* 
ABSTRACT: In recent years, Leibniz’s previously unpublished writings have cast a new light 
on his relationship with Erhard Weigel, from a mere influence during the early years to an 
exchange of ideas that lasted at least until Weigel’s death in 1699. In this paper I argue 
that Weigel’s De supputatione multitudinis a nullitate per unitates finitas in infinitum 
collineantis ad deum is one of the most important influences on Leibniz’s development of 
binary arithmetic. This work published in 1679, the same year of Leibniz’s De progressione 
dyadica, contains some fundamental ideas adopted by Leibniz both in mathematics and 
metaphysics. The controversial theories expressed in these writings will also help in 
understanding why Leibniz tried to hide Weigel’s influence during his life.  
SOMMARIO: In questi anni, a seguito della pubblicazione degli scritti inediti di Leibniz, è 
emersa con maggior chiarezza l’importanza del suo rapporto con Erhard Weigel, 
suggerendo un’influenza che non si limita al periodo di formazione a Jena, ma che tiene 
anche in considerazione gli anni successivi, fino alla morte di Weigel nel 1699. In questo 
articolo viene mostrato come l’opera di Weigel, intitolata De supputatione multitudinis a 
nullitate per unitates finitas in infinitum collineantis ad deum, possa essere considerata 
come uno dei testi fondamentali che hanno influenzato Leibniz nello sviluppo 
dell’aritmetica binaria. Pubblicata nel 1679, lo stesso anno in cui Leibniz scrisse il De 
progressione dyadica, quest’opera contiene alcune idee fondamentali che Leibniz decise di 
adottare, sia in ambito matematico, sia in ambito metafisico. Le controverse teorie esposte 
                                                            
* This paper is based on a conference held in December 14, 2015 at Sapienza 
University of Rome and organized by the ILIESI (Institute for the European intellectual 
lexicon and history of ideas) and the Italian Sodalitas Leibnitiana. I would like to thank 
them for their invitation and support. I would also like to thank Gianfranco Mormino 
and Federico Silvestri for their help during the draft of this paper. 
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in questi scritti aiuteranno inoltre a esprimere un’ipotesi ragionevole sul perché Leibniz 
tentò di nascondere in vita l’influenza di Weigel sul suo pensiero. 
KEYWORDS: Binary arithmetic; Dyadic; Philosophy of Mathematics; Erhard Weigel 
1. Introduction 
Erhard Weigel was Leibniz’s teacher in mathematics and metaphysics 
during the semester that Leibniz spent in Jena in 1663.1 He is generally 
considered an important influence on the philosophy of the young Leibniz 
and its development, but this importance is somehow lost in the 
outstanding number of authors that Leibniz managed to read during his 
early years, making it difficult to understand its exact extent. Some 
interpreters2 focus on Weigel’s influence in specific topics, such as the 
endorsement of Aristotelic ideas, the mathematization of reality or logical 
reasoning, but a complete reconstruction of the relationship between 
Weigel and Leibniz is still missing. 
Recently, the secondary literature is focusing more and more on this 
relationship, with rather interesting results: it can be proved that Leibniz 
extensively read Weigel’s works not only at the beginning of his 
philosophical career but also throughout his whole life.3 The fact that this 
intercourse should not lead to the acknowledgment of Weigel’s importance 
                                                            
1 For a reconstruction of Leibniz’s life and his first meeting with Weigel see M. R. 
Antognazza, Leibniz: an intellectual biography, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2009, p. 58-59. 
2 On the problem of identifying Weigel’s exact influence on the young Leibniz see F. 
Piro, Varietas identitate compensata: studio sulla formazione metafisica di Leibniz, Napoli, 
Bibliopolis, 1990, but also F. Piro, “Species infima. Definibilità e indefinibilità 
dell’individuo”, in B. M. d’Ippolito, A. Montano, F. Piro (ed.), Monadi e monadologie. Il 
mondo degli individui tra Bruno, Leibniz e Husserl. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di 
Studi [Salerno, 10-12 giugno 2004], Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino Editore, 2005, p. 83-
113 for a criticism on an easy identification of Weigel’s thesis with those contained at the 
end of Leibniz’s Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui. On the same topic see also 
C. Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development, Cambridge, Cambridge k 
University Press, 2002. One of the most important books dedicated to Leibniz and Weigel 
is K. Moll, Der junge Leibniz, Bd. I: Die wissenschaftstheoretische Problemstellung seines 
ersten Systementwurf. Der Anschluss an Erhard Weigel, Stuttgart-Bad, Frommann-
Holzboog, 1978. On the influence in Leibniz’s logic, a recent paper is M. Bullynck, 
“Erhard Weigel’s Contributions to the Formation of Symbolic Logic”, History and 
Philosophy of Logic, 34 (1), 2013, p. 25-34. 
3 See M. Palumbo, “‘Praeceptor, Fautorque meus colendus…’ – Weigels Werke in der 
Privatbibliothek von Leibniz”, in K. Habermann-K.-D. Herbst (ed.), Erhard Weigel (1625-
1699) und seine Schüler. Beiträge des 7. Erhard-Weigel-Kolloquiums 2014, Göttingen, 
Universitätsverlag Göttingen 2016, p. 249-268. 
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at a later time is perhaps influenced by Leibniz himself, who in a letter to 
Christian Philipp dated March 1681 shares this opinion on him: 
Mons. Weigelius a beaucoup d’esprit sans doute; mais souvent il est peu intelligible, 
et il semble qu’il n’a pas tousjours des pensées bien nettes. Je voudrois qu’il 
s’appliquât plus tost à nous donner quantité de belles observations, qu’il a pû faire en 
practiquant les mecaniques, que de s’amuser à des raisonnemens generaux, où il me 
semble qu’il se perd quelques fois. Non obstant tout cela je ne laisse pas de l’estimer 
beaucoup; et de reconnoistre qu’il se trouve beaucoup de bonnes pensées dans tous 
ses écrits.4 
This is a perfect example of Leibniz’s general and ambiguous attitude 
towards Weigel: on one hand he prises some of Weigel’s ideas and, on the 
other hand he acts as if he is judging them from a distance, without 
explicitly recognising their direct influence on his philosophy. As Leibniz 
remarked, being a philosopher who establishes a perfect connection 
between metaphysics, ontology, physics and human knowledge, Weigel 
may appear confusing, especially since his style somehow tries to express all 
these relationships at the same time, but this difficulty shouldn’t sway us 
from our purpose of identifying the exact extent of his influence. 
Following this purpose, in this paper I will argue that Weigel played a 
fundamental role in Leibniz’s development of binary arithmetic, especially 
at the very beginning of Leibniz’s reflections on this topic in 1679. I believe 
that the outcome of this confrontation could prove itself extremely useful 
for understanding some intricacies that were always related to binary 
arithmetic in Leibniz: its relation with the other parts of Leibniz’s 
philosophy and their development in time, or its enigmatic use both as a 
mathematical and a metaphysical tool. The outcome of this analysis will be 
that Leibniz has not developed binary arithmetic as a mere mathematical 
tool and then applied it to metaphysics only at a later time. Since the very 
beginning he was in fact influenced by Weigel’s De supputatione 
multitudinis a nullitate per unitates finitas in infinitum collineantis ad 
deum. This work already embeds some of the most important features of 
Leibniz’s binary arithmetic, both from the mathematical and metaphysical 
point of view. It also helps us in understanding why and how the topic of 
binary arithmetic could be related to the topic of analysis situs, which had a 
                                                            
4 G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Darmstadt-Leipzig-Berlin, Akademie 
der Wissenschaften (Akademieausgabe), 1923-, collected in 8 Series, each one divided in 
several volumes, II-1, p. 815. 
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fundamental evolution in the same year in which Leibniz developed his 
binary system.  
As a starting point, in the first section I will outline the correspondence 
between Weigel and Leibniz in 1679, in order to point out the importance 
of Weigel’s De supputatione in the light of a Pythagorean influence and a 
possible connection between the ideas expressed in the letters and binary 
arithmetic. In the second section, I will offer a brief introduction on 
Leibniz’s binary arithmetic, focusing on some important concepts spread 
throughout his writings, and a thorough analysis of Weigel’s De 
supputatione. The exact correspondence between Leibniz’s and Weigel’s 
ideas will lead us to recognize Weigel as one of the main influences in the 
development of Leibniz’s arithmetic. Ultimately, the analysis of these 
topics will help us to express a reasonable hypothesis on why Leibniz tried 
to hide Weigel’s influence during his life. 
2. The confrontation with Weigel in 1679 
The topic of a supposed influence of Weigel on Leibniz’s development of 
binary arithmetic is rather old and dates back to Couturat’s La logique de 
Leibniz. In this book Couturat argues with an impressive intuition, given 
the availability of primary sources at that time, that Leibniz was influenced 
by Weigel’s Tetractys, a work published in 1673 which explains a way of 
counting in a base-four system, instead of the usual base-ten one. 
Couturat’s reasoning is simple: since the first writing on binary arithmetic 
in Leibniz, De progressione dyadica, is dated 15 March 1679, it could be 
that Leibniz took the idea of changing the base and then applied it to his 
base-two system. This interpretation is justified by a kind of accusation 
formulated by Johann Bernoulli in a letter dated 11 April 1701 in which he 
outlines the similarities between the two systems, more than Couturat’s 
actual research on Weigel.5 In a letter dated 20 April 1701, Leibniz replies 
                                                            
5 In the Logique we read: “son Arithmétique dyadique ou sa numération binaire. Il 
importe de donner un peu plus de détails sur celle-ci. On a vu que Leibniz avait été amené 
à cette invention par la recherche d’une notation aussi claire et aussi adéquate que possible 
pour les nombres. Elle lui avait été probablement suggérée par la Tetractys de son ancien 
maître Weigel, publiée en 1673. Leibniz n’approuvait pas ce système de numération a base 
4, qui n’avait aucune raison d’être” and again in the related footnote: “Pourtant Leibniz 
prétendait plus tard avoir inventé sa Dyadique avant la Tetractys de Weigel. Peut-être sa 
mémoire le trompait-elle, ou s’exagérait-il son originalité; peut-être aussi l’idée première 
lui avait-elle été suggérée, non par le livre, mais par l’enseignement de son maitre : Lettre à 
Jean Bernoulli, 29 avril 1701: ‘Molitus hoc sum ante multos annos, etiam antequam 
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that, even if the similarities could be perceived, he started his reflections on 
these topics many years before he read Weigel’s works. On a side note, he 
also adds that his system is much more useful than the one explained by 
Weigel, because there is no real reason for a human being to change his way 
of counting from a base-ten model to a base-four one, whereas the base-two 
model follows the idea of simplicity, since only the digit 1 and the digit 0 
are used. At the same time, Leibniz’s system shows in his opinion a better 
way to express some proprieties that pertain numbers in general and their 
progression. Despite Leibniz’s efforts in pointing out the originality of his 
theory, it seems that the idea of a decisive influence by Weigel was shared 
between Bernoulli’s brothers, as a letter from Jakob Bernoulli dated 28 
February 1705 shows: “De mysterio Arithmeticae Tuae Dyadicae (quam video 
esse supplementum Tetractys Weigelianae) nihil adhuc mihi innotuerat”.6 
The topic of understanding Weigel’s influence then seems to be 
reduced to whether believe or not in Leibniz when he says that he was not 
aware of Weigel’s writings at the time of the birth of binary arithmetic. 
Another take on this problem is that of Gaston Grua, who argues that 
Couturat mistook Weigel’s Aretologistica with the Tetractys: “La Tetractys 
classe les êtres par quatre. L’invention du calcul binaire le 15 mars 1679 ne 
lui doit rien, malgré COUT. Op. 278, qui a confundu cet ouvrage avec le 
premier exposé de la numération quaternaire, en 1687, en appendice à 
l’Aretologistica”.7 Grua bases his assumptions on a passage from Leibniz’s 
Animadversiones ad Weigelium: 
Atque hoc nunc quidem ad Speculum Viennese breviter notare placuit; praesertim 
cum nondum antea mihi fuerit lectus hic liber, non magis quam alter 
Aretologisticus, qui longius etiam sese in res metaphysicas diffundit […]. Quod 
tetractycam arithmeticen attinet, arbitror in praxi si quid mutandum esset potius 
duodecimalem vel sedecimalem fore adhibendam pro decimali; quo majoris enim 
numeri progressio adhibentur (dummodo tabulae Pythagoricae fundamentales 
memoria teneantur) eo expeditior est calculus […] puto non tantum tertactycam 
                                                                                                                                           
quicquam constaret de Tetracty illa nuper ressuscitata (Math, III, B, 2)’” (See L. Couturat, 
La logique de Leibniz : d’apres des documents inédits, Paris, F. Alcan, 1901, p. 473). As for 
Bernoulli and Leibniz’s correspondence on this topic see the forthcoming Leibniz, 
Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, III-8. 
6 G. W. Leibniz, Leibnizes mathematische Schriften, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, Hildesheim-
New York, Georg Olms Verlag, 1971, vol. III, p. 96. 
7 See G. W. Leibniz, Textes inédits d’après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque provinciale 
de Hanovre, ed. G. Grua, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, Tome I, p. 330. 
Mattia Brancato 
 156 
decimali esse praeferendam; sed et ipsi teractycae rursus praeferendam esse dyadicam, 
quae omnium perfectissima est.8 
Both Couturat’s and Grua’s theories are somehow defective for different 
reasons. We cannot prove with Couturat that Leibniz read the Tetractys 
before 1679, because Leibniz’s first references to this work are notes taken in 
1683, after the birth of the calculus.9 But, Grua’s assumption that Weigel’s 
first writing on a base-four model is the Aretologistica, dated 1687 i.e. after 
Leibniz’s De progressione dyadica, is based on a mistake.10 Around 1673 
Weigel published not one, but two different works, one entitled Tetractyn 
tetracty pythagoreae correspondentem, and the other one entitled Tetractys 
Summum tum Arithmeticae tum Philosophiae discursivae Compendium. If it 
is true that the former work, the one that was probably verified by Grua, 
deals only with the general ideas related to the tetractys, the latter contains a 
base-four model very similar to that of the 1687’s Aretologistica.11 
The reconstruction of these interpretations however leads us to an 
important result: even if it is highly doubtful, we could still believe Leibniz 
when he declares to Bernoulli that he was not influenced by Weigel’s 
Tetractys. In fact, we could still believe that he was referring only to the 
specific work entitled Tetractys and assume that Leibniz’s notes on it dated 
1683 correspond also to the first moment in which he actually read it. But 
the same thing cannot be said for the reference to Weigel in the 
Animadversiones ad Weigelium, because in this work Leibniz deals with 
Weigel’s base-four system in general. The Animadversiones are in fact dated 
                                                            
8 G. W. Leibniz, Nouvelles lettres et opuscules inédits de Leibniz, ed. A. Foucher de 
Careil, Paris, 1857, p. 164-166. 
9 See Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI-4B, p. 1162. Around 1683 (the exact 
date is uncertain) Leibniz reads and annotates several writings published by Weigel in 
1673: the Tetractys, summum tum arithmeticae tum philosophiae discursivae compendium 
artis magnae sciendi genuina radix and the Tetractyn Pythagoreae corrspondentem ut 
PRIMUM disceptationum suarum specimen ulteriori curiosorum industria exponit Societas 
Pythagorea, but also the Methodus discendi nov-antiqua, the Universi corporis Pansophici 
caput summum a rebus naturalibus moralibus et notionalibus denominativo simul et 
aestimativo gradu cognoscendis abstractum and the Corporis pansophici pantologia. These 
works are particularly interesting for Leibniz’s development of his analysis situs. 
10 This mistake is also made in other reconstructions of the history of binary 
arithmetic, for example in A. Glaser, History of binary and other nondecimal numeration, 
Pennsylvania, Tomash Publishers, 1981. Another take against Weigel’s influence on the 
birth of binary arithmetic is found in H. H. Knecht, La logique chez Leibniz. Essai sur le 
rationalisme baroque, Lausanne, L’Age d’Homme, 1981, p. 28. 
11 See E. Weigel, Tetractys summum tum arithmeticae tum philosophiae discursivae 
compendium, artis mangnae sciendi genuina radix, Jena, Sumptibus Johannis Meyeri, Typis 
Wertheriani, 1673, p. 15-24. 
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1690 and at that time Leibniz already read the Tetractys and several other 
works by Weigel, included his De supputatione, as we will soon prove. In 
other words, it seems somehow suspicious that in the Animadversiones 
Leibniz, after so many reads on Weigel, feels the need of quoting the 
Aretologistica, an obscure and confusing work in German, published many 
years after the first writings on this topic, while he was perfectly aware of 
Weigel’s earlier and more important essays written in Latin. It is as if 
Leibniz wanted to divert the attention from the similarities between him 
and Weigel. I believe that this is a key factor in determining the extent of 
Weigel’s influence, because it suggests that perhaps there are more 
similarities than the ones generally recognised. The older interpretations 
are based in fact only on a supposed influence on the idea of changing the 
base system and on the operations derived from this change, but I would 
like to argue that Weigel’s influence is much deeper and it has its roots also 
in the metaphysical background related to binary arithmetic. 
The first step in this direction is the analysis of Leibniz’s and Weigel’s 
correspondence. It seems that everything revolves around year 1679, the 
fated year of Leibniz’s De progressione dyadica, and it is not a coincidence that 
the first letter to Weigel was sent by Leibniz in the same year, in September. 
This letter starts with an extremely useful information for our purposes:  
Dissertationem tuam de supputatione legi non sine magna animi voluptate et quod 
eam mittere voluisti gratias ago. Quanquam enim nonnulla non satis assequerer, 
multa tamen notavi praeclara et profunda. Eaque occasione Tibi proponam 
observationem meam quae ad institutum tuum (tractas enim ut in titulo habes de 
supputatione multitudinis a nullitate per unitates finitas in infinitum collineantis ad 
Deum) pertinere nonnihil videtur.12 
In this passage we can infer that in September 1679 Leibniz already read 
Weigel’s De supputatione, but also that we don’t know the beginning of this 
correspondence, that is Weigel’s first letter, or something similar, in which 
he attached his work. Given that, this work contains many similarities with 
Leibniz’s writings on binary arithmetic, determining if Leibniz received it 
before the 15th of March 1679 could also determine if Leibniz was directly 
influenced by Weigel on this topic in that year. Unfortunately, there is no 
way to retrieve this information, but further observations are needed. 
Weigel’s De supputatione could have been published before the 15th of 
March 1679, plus it wouldn’t be the first time in which Leibniz is aware of 
                                                            
12 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II-1B, p. 745. 
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a work written by Weigel before its actual publication, even more 
considering that at that time Weigel already had a high opinion of his 
disciple.13 Also, Leibniz’s letter seems at least unusual: it starts with this 
reference to Weigel’s work but, given that few months before Leibniz 
already developed his binary arithmetic, one would think that the 
observations Leibniz wants to make are going to be a brief exposition of 
this theory, in order to celebrate the affinity with his teacher’s ideas. 
Surprisingly, there is no mention of his binary arithmetic in this letter, 
replaced instead with an exposition on peculiar proprieties pertaining some 
number series. Besides, this is not a letter with no philosophical or 
mathematical content, since, aside from the aforementioned number series, 
there are also references to Leibniz’s 1672 Accessio ad Arithmeticam 
Infinitorum and to his recently developed characteristica geometrica.14 
By no means the observation on number series is not consistent with 
the topics of the De supputatione, as Leibniz himself writes, because the 
number series chosen are built through a continuous addition of unities in 
order to generate the series of natural numbers, the series of triangular 
numbers and the series of pyramidal numbers. These series are similar to the 
Pythagorean ideas expressed in Weigel’s De supputatione, because they suggest 
the possibility of expressing geometrical dimensions through the repetition of 
a simple unity. However, if this was Leibniz’s aim, the absence of a theory, such 
that of binary arithmetic, representing so well the idea of a constitution of the 
world through unity and zero couldn’t be a mere coincidence. 
The analysis of the exchange between Weigel and Leibniz then 
suggests that a study on the ideas and terminology used in their 1679’s 
                                                            
13 In a letter to Hermann Conring dated April 1670 we read: “Audio et Cl. V. 
Erhardum Weigelium, libello de aestimatione mox prodituro, plurima ex jure nostro, quae 
ad quantitates gradusque voluntatis, scientiae, diligentiae, malitiae, poenae, damni, 
certitudinis, praesumtionis, probabilitatis, aliorumque, quorum in re morali crebra mentio 
est, delibaturum” (Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II-1, p. 70). The reference is 
probably to Weigel’s Universi corporis pansophici caput summum, a work that will be 
published three years after this letter. It is particularly relevant for two reasons: it is a work 
in which some important ideas related to the Tetractys are already present and it is one of 
the work analysed by Leibniz in 1683, casting a lot of doubts on the hypothesis that those 
notes could testify that those works, Tetractys included, were read by Leibniz for the first 
time in 1683. About Weigel’s appreciation for Leibniz, the very last sentence of Weigel’s 
Corollaria in his Pendulum ex tetracy deductum...sistit is: “Speciosa est hypothesis 
Leibnüziana, quae bullulis pleraque Phaenomena Corporum salvare docet” (E. Weigel, 
Pendulum ex tetracy deductum...sistit, Jena, Typis Johannis Wertheri, 1674). 
14 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II-1B, p. 745 n., 747 n. 
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writings is needed in order to compensate for the lack of information on 
the reception of Weigel’s De supputatione. 
3. De organo sive arte magna cogitandi in the light of Weigel’s De supputatione 
Retracing the influences of other authors in Leibniz’s four-page manuscript 
De progressione dyadica is not an easy task: Leibniz presents here nothing 
more than the operations needed in his binary calculus (addition, 
subtraction and the like) and the hypothesis for a machine built on these 
principles. Perhaps the only hint we could find in this work is a reference to 
the multiplication table, called table of Pythagoras, that here is quoted two 
times.15 It tells us that one of the main topics involved in the development 
of the calculus is the possibility of simplifying operations or completely 
avoiding the use of such tables. This topic is consistent with what Leibniz 
writes in the Animadversiones ad Weigelium, in which he points out, 
quoting again the table of Pythagoras, how the use of Weigel’s four-base 
model does not help much in this effort, as we already showed. 
Thankfully, Leibniz’s De organo sive arte magna cogitandi, written 
around the same time of his progressione dyadica, gives us a better 
understanding of Weigel’s influence. In this work Leibniz associates for the 
first time his binary calculus to the metaphysical relationship between 
unity and nothingness:  
Fieri potest, ut non nisi unicum sit quod per se concipitur, nimirum Deus ipse, et 
praeterea nihilum seu privatio, quod admirabili similitudine declarabo. Numeros 
vulgo explicamus per progressionem decadicam, ita ut cum ad decem pervenimus, 
rursus ab unitate incipiamus, quam commode id factum sit nunc non disputo; illud 
interea ostendam, potuisse ejus loco adhiberi progressionem dyadicam, ut statim ubi 
ad binarium pervenimus rursus ab unitate incipiamus […] Immensos hujus 
progressionis usus nunc non attingo: illud suffecerit annotare quam mirabili ratione 
hoc modo omnes numeri per unitatem et nihilum exprimantur.16 
This relationship, displayed at such an early stage in the history of binary 
arithmetic, proves that since its beginning Leibniz develops the 
mathematical achievements together with the metaphysical ones. 
Following the platonic tradition, Leibniz conceives nothingness as non-
existence, as a tool that helps shaping the world, but what he adds is that 
the role of nothingness resembles the role of the mathematical zero, 
                                                            
15 See G. W. Leibniz, LH 35, 3b 2 Bl, p. 1, 3. 
16 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI-4A, p. 158. 
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whereas the role of existence, both God and creature’s kind of existence, 
resembles the role of the mathematical unity. It follows that binary 
arithmetic is also somehow connected to the idea of an essential limitation 
pertaining creatures,17 to the problem of distinguishing the unity expressed 
by God from that of such creatures and to the true nature of nothingness, 
both as an absolute concept and as something that can be conceived only 
together with something else. 
After this work, evidences of this reasoning are spread all over 
Leibniz’s production about binary arithmetic. In the 1695 Dialogue effectif 
sur la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal, after having introduced the 
concept of nothingness, to the question on how nothingness is capable of 
entering in the composition of things, Leibniz replies: “vous savez pourtant 
comment dans l’Arithmétique les zero joints aux unités, font des nombres 
differens comme 10, 100, 1000 […] et il e nest de même de toutes les autres 
choses, car ells sont bornées ou imparfaites par le principe de la Negation 
ou du Neant qu’elles renferment”.18 Here we have both the use of unities 
and zero in a composition and the idea of a priority of unity over zero, 
which resembles closely the priority of existence over non-existence. Three 
years after this dialogue, in a letter to Schulenburg dated 29 March 1698, 
the bond with essential limitation is even stronger:  
Nimirum fines seu limites sunt de Essentia Creaturarum, limites autem sunt aliquid 
privativum, consistuntque in negatione progressus ulterioris. Interim fatendum est, 
creaturam, postquam jam valorem a Deo nacta est, qualisque in sensus incurrit, 
aliquid etiam positivum continere, seu aliquid habere ultra fines neque adeo in meros 
limites seu indivisibilia posse resolve […] Atque haec est origo rerum ex Deo et 
nihilo, positivo et privativo, perfectione et imperfectione, valore et limitibus, activo 
et passivo, forma (id est entelechia, nisu, vigore) et materia seu mole, per se torpente 
nisi quod resistentiam habet. Illustravi ista nonnihil origine numerorum ex 0 et 1 a 
me observata, quae pulcherrimum est emblema perpetuae rerum creationis ex nihilo, 
dependentiaeque a Deo.19 
                                                            
17 On this topic see M. Fichant, “L’origine de la négation”, in Id., Science et 
métaphysique dans Descartes et Leibniz, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, p. 85-
119, but also W. Hübener, “Scientia de aliquo et nihilo. Die historischen Voraussetzungen 
von Leibniz’ Ontologiebegriff’”, in Id., Zum Geist der Prämoderne, Würzburg, 
Königshausen-Neumann, 1985, p. 84-100 and G. Mormino, “La limitazione originaria 
delle creature in Leibniz”, in d’Ippolito, Montano, Piro (ed.), Monadi e monadologie, p. 
115-140. 
18 G. W. Leibniz, “Dialogue effectif sur la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal”, in 
Id., Dialoghi filosofici e scientifici, ed. F. Piro, Milano, Bompiani, 2007, p. 320. 
19 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II-3B, p. 426-427. 
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The same reasoning is also present in the famous Explication de 
l’arithmetique binaire, written in 1703, were Leibniz adds that: 
le calcul par deux, c’est à-dire par 0 et par 1, en récompense de sa longueur, est le plus 
fondamental pour la science, et donne de nouvelles découvertes, qui se trouvent 
utiles ensuite, même pour la pratique des nombres, et surtout pour la Géométrie, 
dont la raison est que les nombres étant reduits aux plus simples principes, comme 0 
et 1, il paroit partout un ordre merveilleux.20 
These quotes show that the metaphysical background of Leibniz’s binary 
arithmetic was consistent throughout his life. This is relevant, since the 
first work on this topic, De organo sive arte magna cogitandi, was written in 
1679: it means that these metaphysical assumptions were maintained 
despite the well-known change in Leibniz’s philosophy happened in the 
1680’s. The previously quoted letter to Schulenburg is perhaps the best 
evidence of this consistency, because the philosophical achievements of 
binary arithmetic are expressed together with Leibniz’s new discoveries on 
the nature of substances.21 
Regarding our purpose of determining a possible influence of Weigel’s 
De supputatione on Leibniz’s De organo, the reference to Leibniz’s writings 
after 1679 was needed in order to point out how the comparison with 
unity, God and nothingness was considered by Leibniz a distinctive feature 
of his base-two model, especially with respect to Weigel’s solution. The 
same reasoning in fact is found in the Animadversiones ad Weigelium,22 
although here expressed in order to state the superiority of Leibniz’s system 
from that of Weigel. It is as if Leibniz himself wanted to divert the 
attention from the metaphysical background to the idea of changing the 
base of counting. In a way, he achieved this result, since both Couturat’s 
and Grua’s reconstruction of the birth of the binary calculus are based on 
the assumption that, if there was some kind of influence by Weigel, it had 
to be only in the mathematical aspect. This theory should be rejected 
judging by what I believe is, in reference to the intercourse between Weigel 
and Leibniz, the most important quote from Weigel’s De supputatione: 
Principium nempe finitatis, ipsiusque multitudinis & ordinis est, quod hinc, etiam 
in computatione primum, ubique praesupponitur. Estque conceptu suo vel purum, 
quod est NULLITAS, τό Nihil, purae computationis (Additionis, Subctrationis) 
principium; vel modale seu mensurativum, quod est τό Semel, aut simplum, modalis 
                                                            
20 Leibniz, Leibnizes mathematische Schriften, vol. VII, p. 225. 
21 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II-3B, p. 427. 
22 Leibniz, Nouvelles lettres, p. 166. 
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computationis (Multiplicationis, Divisionis) principium : Quatuor haec (principium, 
bina data, productum seu τό Facit) exacta proportione sui generis progrediuntur, 
dum in omni computo, sicut se principium ad datorum unum habet.23 
In order to understand this quote, a look at the very beginning of De 
supputatione is needed. Here, some universal rules are set:  
I. Omnia quae realiter (i.e. actu) sunt, singularia sunt. 
II. Omnes Actiones reales circa singularia sunt. 
III. Omia singularia finita Valorem in se complectuntur Pondere, Mensura, Numero, 
sed & Ordine, certum; inter se certa Ratione certaque Proportione definita sunt. 
IV. Omnes agendo circa res occupati Supputant”.24 
According to Weigel, everything in this world can be conceived as a unity. 
This possibility deprives every object of their specific proprieties, but at the 
same time it makes them homogeneous one another, that is suitable for a 
mathematical description. The first quote then shows that every finite 
object conceived this way is a single entity composed of nothingness and 
unity. In Weigel’s philosophy in fact, the word Semel stands for unity or 
God, because it is a reference to the most important operation related to 
divinity, that is multiplication. It is extremely relevant because, unlike a 
generic platonic reference to non-existence, these universal principles are 
associated with mathematical operations. The idea is that God represents 
pure unity, while creatures represent compositions of unity and 
nothingness, that is zero. The expression of God’s infinity is multiplication, 
because the multiplication 1 x 1, while it could be executed indefinitely, 
still gives as a result the pure unity. God then embeds the whole world, that is 
the product of all its finite unities, from nothingness to pure infinity, as the 
complete title of De supputatione suggests. It follows that addition and 
subtraction are considered in a negative way, thus associated with nothingness: 
addition and subtraction force things to come into existence as separate things, 
because they free them from the logic of unities’ multiplications. Given these 
premises, Weigel adds a fundamental consequence: 
                                                            
23 E. Weigel, De supputatione multitudinis a nullitate per unitates finitas in infinitum 
collineantis ad deum quavis demonstratione certius, ostendendum reflexa, publice 
disputabunt præses Erhardus Weigelius ... et respondens Caspar Bussingius, Jena, Typis 
Bauhoferianis, 1679, part I, § 29. I’m quoting this work by using the reference to its parts 
and chapters. Weigel’s De supputatione in fact was published with no page numbers until 
part III, making the reference to a specific page confusing for the reader. 
24 Weigel, De supputatione, Preface. 
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Sicut autem primum omnium Veritatum principium […] est Veritas infinita, DEUS; 
Objectivum autem NULLITAS qua puram; UNITAS finita (simplicissime punctum) 
qua modalem, finitorum rationem; ita TETRACTYS ab utroque principio, per 
quaternitates propotionum, illic purarum, hic modalium.25 
The tetractys then was chosen by Weigel because it shares through 
proportions a relationship with both unity and nothingness. It is 
important to remember that, despite the impossibility of proving that 
Leibniz read the Tetractys at this stage, Weigel had already published this 
work in 1673. Therefore, in 1679’s De supputatione, while establishing a 
relation between the Pythagorean tetractys and the metaphysical concepts 
of unity and nothingness, Weigel establishes also a relationship between his 
base-four arithmetic and these philosophical ideas: “rationes numerorum 
& ordinum, earumque progressionem quadrordinalem (Tetractyn) 
secudum quam DEUS in gratiam humanae Mentis omnes Essentias tanta 
varietatis pulcritudine concinnavit, supputando penetremus”.26 It follows 
that there is no way of understanding Weigel’s influence on Leibniz as a 
mere suggestion on changing numbering’s base model. Weigel was 
extremely close to binary arithmetic as it was conceived by Leibniz, because 
every element of it was already present in his works, so much that Leibniz’s 
efforts could be seen as a prosecution of his teacher’s work, as Bernulli 
suggested. 
Leibniz’s image of the world’s creation through unity and nothingness 
and its mathematical expression then were already present in Weigel, but a 
possible criticism to this interpretation would be that of arguing for a 
simple Pythagorean influence, rather than a specific influence by Weigel’s 
Pythagoreanism. Even accepting this criticism, we could remark that before 
1679 Leibniz quoted Pythagoras mainly in geometrical writings, for obvious 
reasons, and together with Plato’s writings concerning metempsychosis, but 
only after April 1679 he is also credited for his metaphysical theories on 
numbers. The most famous quote is that of De numeris characteristicis ad 
linguam universalem constituendam, again in 1679: 
Vetus verbum est, Deum omnia pondere, mensura, numero fecisse. Sunt autem quae 
ponderari non possunt, scilicet quae vim ac potentiam nullam habent; sunt etiam 
quae carent partibus ac proinde mensuram non recipiunt. Sed nihil est quod 
numerum non patiatur. Itaque numerus quasi figura quaedam metaphysica est, et 
Arithmetica est quaedam Statica Universi, qua rerum gradus explorantur. Jam inde a 
                                                            
25 Ibid., part I, § 27. 
26 Ibid., part III, § 20. 
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Pythagora persuasi fuerunt homines, maxima in numeris mysteria latere. Et 
Pythagoram credibile est, ut alia multa, ita hanc quoque opinionem ex Oriente 
attulisse in Graeciam.27 
Almost every information displayed here could be retraced in Weigel’s De 
supputatione, from the famous partition in “pondere, mensura, numero”28 to 
the less famous use of the metaphysical number, making him at least the 
major influence in the adoption of Pythagorean theories.29 
Particularly interesting is the way in which Leibniz defines arithmetic 
related to the description of the world as a Statica Universi. This term 
suggests the idea that arithmetic could offer us a kind of static description 
of the world, but this idea is not consistent with the basic notion we have 
about arithmetic: if this description involves the use of arithmetical 
operations, it cannot be based solely on them, because the world is shaped 
in a different way than that of numbers. Both are well-ordered systems, but 
the relationship between things in our world need some kind of spatial 
reference that numbers per se don’t need. This order is expressed in Weigel 
by the notion of Status. Again, the reference to Weigel could help in 
explaining Leibniz’s theory. As we previously sketched, in Weigel’s 
philosophy every entity is conceived as a unity, making it suitable for 
mathematical operations. However, the existence of our world and the 
possibility of knowing it is not based solely on arithmetic, but on the study 
of the relational proprieties30 and positions of such unities: 
Cujus & totius, & cujusque partis, ut numeri partialis, unitates ORDINE certo, simul 
ac numerantur, etiam disponuntur a DEO, tum simul, & Ordo dicitur Status; tum 
secundum prius & posterius, & Ordo dicitur Motus.31 
For Weigel, Status is the set of relationships between unities that give birth 
to the world in an instant, while Motus is the connection of these 
instantaneous descriptions of the world in time. In other words, they are 
Weigel’s equivalent of space and time, as he himself writes in his first reply 
to Leibniz’s 1679 letter: 
                                                            
27 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI-4A, p. 263.  
28 A part from the already quoted preface, see also Weigel, De supputatione, part I, § 
36 and part III, § 22. 
29 “Mirum non est, quod TETRACTYS a Pythagoraeis adeo celebrata” (ibid., part I, § 27). 
30 “Actiones enim rebus singularibus intercedunt, quae certa ratone (valoris & 
ordinis) inter se, tum essentialiter, quoad rationem status; tum accidentaliter quoad certos 
in operando casus & circumstantias, proportionatae sunt: ipsa vero proportio non nisi 
computando definiri potest” (ibid., part I, § 21). 
31 Ibid., part II, § 17. 
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Spatium (sc. ubicativum, i.e. rerum juxta se mutuo simul existentium non-
repugnantia loco nihili,rerumque concepta) et Tempus in abstracto (tanquam 
Spatium quandicativum,i.e. rerum omnium, ut unius copiae, secundum prius et 
posterius existentium i.e. repetitarum, non-repugnantia loco nihili rerumque 
concepta) tanto magis analoga sunt inter se, quanto praecisius utrumque dicit 
potentiam perceptibilis positionis, illud simultaneae hoc successivae.32 
This reference could explain, with regards to the development of Leibniz’s 
philosophy, how binary arithmetic fits in 1679’s renewed interest in logic33 
and analysis situs. 
Another important resemblance between Weigel’s De supputatione 
and Leibniz’s De organo pointing in this direction is found at the starting 
point of the reasoning leading to the binary system in De organo: for a 
theory that claims the possibility of describing the whole world through a 
peculiar way of expressing numbers and their operations, it seems unusual 
that the first step in this direction would be an analysis of the relationship 
between the world and the human mind. We would be inclined to think in 
fact that such description of the world would be a sort of objective 
description, since it’s based on purely mathematical assumptions. In this 
work however, before the introduction of the binary system, Leibniz 
reflects on the idea of conceivability: 
Maximum Menti Remedium est si inveniri possint cogitationes paucae, ex quibus 
exurgant ordine cogitationes aliae infinitae. Quemadmodum ex paucis numeris ab 
unitate usque ad denarium sumtis caeteri omnes numeri ordine derivari possunt. 
Quicquid cogitatur a nobis aut per se concipitur, aut alterius conceptum involvit. 
Quicquid in alterius conceptu involvitur id rursus vel per se concipitur vel alterius 
conceptum involvit […] Tametsi infinita sint quae concipiuntur, possibile tamen est 
pauca esse quae per se concipiuntur. Nam per paucorum combinationem infinita 
componi possunt.34 
Many ideas expressed in this brief passage date back to Leibniz’s early years, 
although here they will be later connected with the binary system. The first 
idea expressed is a minimalistic approach to universal principles. The 
                                                            
32 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II-1B, p. 762. 
33 Leibniz kept the connection between logic and binary arithmetic also in later 
writings. For example in the Explication de l’arithmetique binaire, after introducing his 
calculus, we read: “Cependant je ne sçai s’il y a jamais eu dans l’écriture Chinoise un 
avantage approchant de celui qui doit être nécessairement dans une Caractéristique que je 
projette. C’est que tout raisonnement qu’on peut tirer des notions, pourroit être tiré de 
leurs Caractères par une manière de calcul, qui seroit un des plus importans mo yens 
d’aider l’esprit humain” (Leibniz, Leibnizes mathematische Schriften, vol. VII, p. 227). 
34 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI-4A, p. 157-158. 
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relationship between the number of universal principles chosen and the 
number of things that they are able to explain should always aim for the 
smallest number of principles and the highest number of things explained 
by them. Leibniz extensively used this idea, for example when he uses the 
principle of contradiction, and I believe it can be proved that a decisive 
influence in its adoption is again that of Weigel, especially between 1663 
and 1672, when Leibniz read his Analysis Aristotelica ex Euclide restituta. 
For our proposes it is sufficient to say that in De organo this minimalistic 
yet fertile approach is connected with numbers and their relationships. A 
passage of Weigel’s De supputatione outlines a similar approach on 
universal principles: “Directorii vero f. Normae moralis, naturaliter & 
ordinarie ducentis, officio funguntur Notitia primae nobiscum nata, quae 
dicuntur Axiomata (v.g. Semel unum est unum etiamsi sit infinitum : Finis 
rei [terminus & limes rei] nihil est prater cogitationem : Finitorum autem 
Bis unum sunt duo : Totum sua parte majus est)”.35 For Weigel, the 
universal principles residing in the human mind are the ones that allow the 
foundation of arithmetic, such as the idea of multiplication, the idea of 
addition and the idea that the whole is bigger than its part. At first it 
wouldn’t seem as if Leibniz’s reasoning in De organo has any kind of 
reference to universal principles. But we should remember that for Leibniz, 
at least after 1672’s Confessio philosophi, conceivability involves non-
contradiction, since in that work he establishes a bond between the 
concept of possibility and the act of conceiving, founding both on the 
principle of contradiction. If conceivability is presented through the 
principle of contradiction, then Leibniz’s reasoning is not that far from his 
mathematics as it may seem: the reader accustomed to these topics in fact 
should recognize that these principles, together with the idea that they 
reside in the human mind, are the ones that Leibniz uses in his foundation 
of arithmetic. At the end of his life, in the Initia rerum mathematicarum 
metaphysica, Leibniz gives us the best example of this foundation, that 
involves the principle of the whole as a coherence tool in order to identify 
the correct order between numbers, exemplified in the relationships given 
in his geometrical analysis situs. The principle for which the whole is always 
bigger than its part is demonstrated by Leibniz using again the principle of 
contradiction or identity,36 justifying his famous idea that the whole of 
                                                            
35 Weigel, De supputatione, part I, § 11. 
36 “Unde videmus demonstrationes ultimum resolvi in duo indemonstrabilia: 
Definitiones seu ideas, et propositiones primitivas, nempe identicas, qualis haec est B est B, 
Leibniz, Weigel and the Birth of Binary Arithmetic 
 
 
167 
mathematics could be derived from this principle. The start of this 
challenging project is Leibniz’s 1679 Characteristica geometrica, coeval with 
his writings on binary arithmetic and with his renewed efforts on the 
universal characteristic. 
Weigel’s De supputatione starts in the same way of Leibniz’s De organo, 
establishing complete homogeneity between the world and the human mind: 
Unusquisque nostrum, etiamsi solus sit, simul ac de semetipso cogitat (dum secum 
habitat) Semetipsum illico familiariter agnoscit: idque (1) Ratione STATUS […] (2) 
Ratione MOTUS […] ex Identitate cogitationis suae successivae clarissime deducit, se 
posterius in essendo praesentem, eundem esse qui, prius in essendo praesens, erat.37 
Here Weigel argues, following probably Descartes’ method, that, even if we 
were completely deprived of our experiences, in our minds is contained 
everything we need not only to understand but also to express the whole 
world. The very simple act of perceiving unity and its constant perception 
in time give birth to the subjective representation of Status and Motus, that 
is space and time. This is possible because of the universal principles 
residing in human minds:38 unity, addition, multiplication and the 
principle for which the whole is bigger than its part, that is Ordo, are the 
same elements that we already saw in the objective description of the world. 
Once corroborated by experiences, these principles show the homogeneity 
between men and the world: 
Axiomatum, ut generalium principiorum, suscitabula sunt Experientiae, tum 
immediata, Mentis ipsius per se v. g. Mentem hominis in Ubi per corpus suum & 
ipsius Mundi definito contineri […] tum mediata, Mentis per sensus, h.e. per 
oblationem ad adjuncto sibi corpore factam, obsevabiles, v.g. Res Mundi circa Nos 
vario Status & Motus variabilis ordine disponi.39 
There are several similarities between these passages and Leibniz’s idea of 
truth expressed through relations, both in understanding truth for things 
that already exist, like in 1677’s Dialogus, or in discovering new ones, as in 
                                                                                                                                           
unumquodque sibi ipsi aequale est, aliaequale hujusmodi infinitae” (Leibniz, Leibnizes 
mathematische Schriften, VII, p. 20) 
37 Weigel, De supputatione, part I, § 1. 
38 “Notitias illas, ut Mentis alias tenebricolae luculas (scintillulas) principia, rationes, & 
causas Mentaliter operandi primas; una cum immediatis experientiis, quisque nostrum 
simpliciter & indubie Semper novit, intime perspectas habet, intelligit, atque sapit” (ibid., § 13). 
39 Ibid., § 12. 
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the ars inveniendi.40 The homogeneity between the universal principles instead 
will be crucial in Leibniz’s Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain. 
As a final remark for this section, I would like to add that the first 
quote of Weigel’s De supputatione here presented could again suggest that 
Leibniz read this work around the time of his De organo: in Weigel, the 
two universal principles are introduced as “τό Nihil” and “τό Semel”. We 
could say that the use of the ancient Greek’s definite article is a distinctive 
trait of Weigel’s writing, used in every work ever published. He uses Latin 
in metaphysical essays, while adding German in order to express examples 
or specimina and Greek for the most important principles of his 
philosophy. The definite article is his way of promoting a concept to a 
universal principle, much like his use of italics or small capitals. This peculiar 
way of writing is not present in Leibniz in the years before 1679, but it 
suddenly appears for the first time in April and vanishes around the end of 
that summer,41 that is the period of time between Leibniz’s De organo and his 
first letter to Weigel. Leibniz adopted this trait and I believe that this could 
be an interesting hint on the exact moment in which Leibniz received 
Weigel’s work, because it is based on a specific pattern, and not on a generic 
use of ancient Greek, very frequent in these kind of writings.  
4. Conclusion 
After having analysed Weigel’s influence, the remaining task is 
understanding why Leibniz tried to hide it throughout his life. The 
obvious conclusion seems to be that Weigel’s theory was too similar to that 
of Leibniz and admitting its influence would have led to a charge of 
plagiarism, but I believe that in Leibniz’s attitude there is more than just 
fear. In 1679, after his stay in Paris, Leibniz achieved a superior 
                                                            
40 Weigel has his own ars inveniendi, called at times deductio productionalis or 
inventio: “Exserit autem se computus per SCISCITATIONEM & INVENTIONEM […] qua 
ratio latens inter ipsas rationes illi conjugatas quaeritur & inventa producitur. Mανθάνω 
enim, latine sciscitare, non est receptas sententias discere, quaerentique verbaliter, i.e. 
interroganti, recitare […] sed ignotas Veritates cum judicio rimari, tandemque si Veritatum 
Autor annuat producere: non ex nihilo, sed ex datis positisque certis veritatibus & 
rationibus” (ibid., § 22). 
41 The first use is a “το non-fortunatum” in the Calculus consequentarum, written in 
April 1679 (Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI-4A, p. 223). Then we find it in De 
negatione (Summer 1679, Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI-4A, p. 300) and in 
the Potest aliqua notio esse alia generalior ut tamen non sit simplicior (Spring – Summer 
1679, Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI-4A, p. 303). 
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mathematical knowledge, unknown to Weigel, that affects their different 
ways of conceiving arithmetic. While in Weigel’s De supputatione the 
relationship between the finite and the infinite is standard – God is the 
expression of the infinite, creatures are the expression of the finite – 
Leibniz had to deal with his recent discoveries on the infinitesimal calculus. 
If both binary arithmetic and the infinitesimal calculus were to be applied 
to an indefinitely divisible world, the problem of dealing with infinity arises 
in a much more complicated way than that of Weigel. Leibniz remarks this 
in the Animadversiones ad Weigelium: 
Scientia de quantitate in universum vel de aestimatione, ut vocat celeberrimus 
Weigelius, mihi pro dimida tantum parte tradita videtur. Exstat enim ea tantum pars 
quae finitas quantitates versat; sed restabat matheseos generalis pars sublimior, ipsa 
scilicet Scientia infiniti saepe ad finitas ipsas investigandas necessaria, quam fortasse 
primus analyticis praeceptis adornavi, novo etiam calculi genere proposito, quem 
nuncegregii viri passim adhibent.42 
Leibniz believed that his binary arithmetic could express a better image of 
the world than Weigel’s calculus. This belief probably explains why 
Leibniz’s first letter to Weigel, instead of reporting the analogies with his 
calculus, deals mainly with the problem of infinity. It is as if Leibniz 
wanted to show to his former teacher his superior mathematical expertise 
by analysing the differences between infinite series43 and, consequently, 
showing that he was more apt to pursue the objectives of the metaphysical 
arithmetic. Weigel’s reply to these remarks shows in fact this fundamental 
difference: “Infinitum enim definiri contradictionem implicat, hinc ipsum 
medium vel quasi nempe  i.e. unum nihil, indefinitum est”,44 encouraging 
Leibniz in reserving this task to himself. Having analysed Weigel’s 
influence however, a better understanding of Leibniz’s aim is possible. He 
believes that binary arithmetic is an appropriate expression of an infinite 
world because, as we saw in Weigel, its description is based on the study of 
relational proprieties, more than arithmetic operations. In this regard, the 
                                                            
42 G. W. Leibniz, Textes inédits, p. 148. 
43 “At summa seriei hujus infinitae  etc. Est  quae quantitas est infinita, 
major scilicet quovis numero assignabili, quemadmodum etiam demonstrare possum. 
Interim multo imo infinities minor est quam summa seriei hujus  etc. Vides itaque 
inter illud infinitum ordinarium, quod in omnium unitatum collectione consistit, et inter 
finitum, nempe unitatem, dari aliquid intermedium nempe  quod est summa fractionum 
omnium possibilium numericarum, unitatem pro numeratore habentium, simul 
sumtarum” (Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II-1B, p. 745). 
44 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II-1B, p. 762. 
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binary system is nothing more than a way of labelling things, much like 
names or characters. Its advantages are that instead of names, it uses only 
two digits, connected in a way that allows, at the same time, the possibility 
of naming things indefinitely and the creation of names that are always 
distinguishable between themselves. However, the fact that order is derived 
solely from the notion of Status is also the most important limit of 
Leibniz’s binary arithmetic: the arithmetical operations lose a distinctive 
role, meaning that a connection between the wonderful proprieties that 
Leibniz saw studying the binary series in artihmetics are not coherently 
related to the use of the binary system in metaphysics. This difference 
explains why Leibniz refers often to the idea of an analogy between binary 
arithmetic and the world, rather than an exact expression. Despite these 
difficulties, Leibniz was probably afraid that the reference to Weigel would 
have diverted the attention from what he believed was a better explanation 
of how binary calculus is useful in dealing with an infinite reality. 
Another reason why Leibniz was not inclined in recognising Weigel’s 
influence is the main metaphysical consequence of a purely mathematical 
description of the world: if unity is what describes the entire world, then 
the difference between God and creatures is at stake. If for Weigel the main 
difference is only that “infinitam dari Mentem, a qua Mentes finitae 
Mensuram capiant”,45 it follows that the universal principles are shared 
between God and his creations. The result is not only that God as the 
Computator acts in the same way of creatures, only with an infinite mind, 
but also that the finite is contained in the infinite through the use of 
multiplication: “ENS REALE vel infinitum est & PRIMUM, DEUS, in quo 
vivimus & movemur”.46 Judging by this quote, it comes as no suprise that in 
the same year Weigel was forced to retract one of his works by the faculty 
of theology. Leibniz was interested in this topic and in Weigel’s 
demonstration of God’s existence47 and maybe this awareness explains the 
need of expressing a criticism to Spinoza in Leibniz’s letter to Schulenburg 
about binary arithmetic.48 
In conclusion, despite these possible explanations of his cautiousness, 
Leibniz was interested in Weigel’s philosophy throughout his whole life. It 
is now clear that since its beginnings Leibniz’s mathematics was influenced 
                                                            
45 Weigel, De supputatione, part I, § 10. 
46 Ibid., part III, § 26. 
47 See S. Di Bella, The Science of the Individual: Leibniz’s Ontology of Individual 
Substance, Dordrecht, Springer, 2010, p. 260-261. 
48 Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II-3B, p. 427. 
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by Weigel on many topics: from the terminology adopted and the reference 
to the Pythagorean tradition to the use of a different base-model, its 
connection with unity and nothingness by means of arithmetical operations, 
and the homogeneity among logical principles in a relational description of 
the world. In 1679 this exchange of ideas gave birth to binary arithmetic. 
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